Thursday, May 22, 2014

Useful Market indicators

-Valuation: USA / Japan / India / REITS


World Stocks 
PE, Dividend Yield(

World stocks ranked by Dividend Yields

http://www.dividendchannel.com/slideshows/?slideshow=mreits&page=1&confirm=1
SLIDESHOW: 10 Top Ranked High Yield REITs

http://www.valueforum.com/reits/high-yielding.mpl
http://www.dividendyieldhunter.com/real-estate-investment-trusts-reits-sorted-alphabetically
http://www.topyields.nl/the-25-highest-yielding-reits.php

http://www.dividend.com/dividend-stocks/reits-dividend-stocks.php
REITS Dividends

http://www.canadastockchannel.com/slideshows/?slideshow=mreits&page=1
SLIDESHOW: 10 Top Ranked High Yield Canadian Real Estate Stocks


http://f10.eastmoney.com/hkf10/ahgzyjtj.aspx?code=00895
A/H shares premium/discount


http://www.macrotrends.net/1335/dollar-gold-and-oil-chart-last-ten-years
Dollar-Oil-Gold

The future is now

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc140428.htm


Price to Sales VS. Price to Earnings

PE can be inflated because now there is assumption that cyclically high profit margin will be permanent.

Market Capitalization to GDP is approaching historical high and from experience,
subsequent market returns will be negative.

For buy-and-hold investors, 7-10 years of investment horizon is not enough. Probably 50 years of horizon should be applied to justify.


關於華爾街現狀及巴菲特遺產投資建議

adapted from:
http://cn.wsj.com/big5/20140519/inv114423.asp?source=newsletter


年來大家普遍認為,隨著金融危機之後聯邦立法機構向曾經利潤豐厚的交易業務開刀,華爾街大型上市公司的規模和利潤都會萎縮。

Quartz網站上的一篇文章列出了一些關於萎縮的具體數字。作者馬克﹒迪坎布裡(Mark DeCambre)寫道:“美國五大銀行──摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)、高盛(Goldman Sachs)、美國銀行(Bank of America)、花旗集團(Citigroup)和摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)──報告2014年第一季度交易收入總額216億美元,較上年同期下降10%,較2009年達到的歷史峰值367億美元下降41%。”

迪坎布裡的文章用一些制作精妙的圖表描述了這種萎縮。文章指出,交易業務受打擊最慘的部分被稱為“FICC”。這是固定收益、外匯和大宗商品的英文首字母縮拼。

他寫道:“這個領域曾經是摩根士丹利和高盛等公司的主要利潤引擎之一,但這種情況已經變了。”

這些變化發生在“沃爾克規則”(Volcker Rule)和“巴塞爾協議III資本規則”等措施之後。前者關閉了銀行自營賬戶的交易活動,後者限制了銀行可以借來擴大其頭寸之回報及風險的資金額度。

華爾街公司仍然可以為對沖基金和保險公司等大型機構客戶交易証券。但在過去一年,這些更加傳統的交易業務也承受了壓力。這是出於另外一個原因:技術創新。

迪坎布裡寫道:“也就是說,電子交易──包括備受詬病的高頻交易──已經大大地壓縮了股票交易員代表客戶匹配買賣訂單這項傳統工作的利潤空間。”

雖然這些大型華爾街機構可能略為穩健且更容易想出應對辦法,但它們將無法利用一度讓它們變得神秘莫測、激動人心、肯定也更加危險的交易獲取“黑箱”利潤。不過,如果說大多數股東並沒有掉太多眼淚的話,那也是可以理解的。

過去兩年,華爾街巨頭的股價表現大都好於整個大盤股市場。

在此期間不認可華爾街股票策略師持續不斷的看漲宣言的人可能會覺得,約翰﹒赫斯曼(John Hussman)是投資界為數不多的老實人之一。

赫斯曼是赫斯曼基金公司(Hussman Funds)的總裁,多數時候看跌。他在最近一份報告中寫道,大市已經被大幅高估。

你會看到他是用收入而非利潤來給市場估值,因為他認為市盈率估值方法蘊含的利潤率假設是不可靠的。

赫斯曼寫道:“雖然証據可能讓一些人甚感驚奇,但還是要睜大眼睛看看:標普500成分股公司的股價/收入比中位數目前已經大大高於2000年的市場峰值。標普500成分股的股價/收入比平均值現在已經高於那次泡沫期間除了2000年一季度、三季度之外的任何時候。”

需要說明的是,過去五年的很多時候,赫斯曼都曾大錯特錯。其他人也很少認為當前股價比2000年泡沫高峰時期更貴。但他的分析至少值得一看。

在本專欄文章的最後,我將介紹有人針對沃倫﹒巴菲特(Warren Buffett)今年早些時候所發言論的一種批評。這種批評很有見地,某種程度上跟巴菲特是針鋒相對的。巴菲特這些言論發表在為他所創辦的投資控股公司伯克希爾哈撒韋(Berkshire Hathaway)所寫的2013年年度致股東信中。

巴菲特曾在他的遺囑中留下受托管理人應當如何投資他為妻子所留遺產的建議。巴菲特在致股東信中描述了這些建議,贏得了指數投資者們的讚揚。巴菲特的指導意見是“將10%的現金放進短期國債,90%的現金放進某個費用非常低的標普500指數型基金(我推薦先鋒集團(Vanguard)的)”。

但《福布斯》(Forbes)撰稿人布賴恩﹒波特努瓦(Brian Portnoy)認為,對於大多數投資者來講,這樣的建議遠遠談不上分散化,因為它是嚴重重倉持有大盤股。他寫道:“正如人們深刻理解且有充分証據証明的,面向關聯度更低的資產的敞口會形成更加優化的投資組合,所以從美國大盤股分散到任何數量的其他股票、債券、房地產和另類資產類別都是行得通的。”

他還批評巴菲特選擇標普500那樣的市值加權指數。他寫道:“在2000年熊市之前,標普500大約29%的成分股都是科技型企業,其中很多估值過高。同樣在2008年危機之前,標普500當中相當大比例的敞口是面向金融、房地產和房貸相關股票,而其中很多都是當年整個市場下跌37%的原因。”

他寫道,除了採用市值加權指數,其實還有更好、更新的指數投資方針,“有時候稱為‘基本面’或‘智能’貝塔系數──對某些股票或風險因素採用不同的加權方法”。

考慮到很多投資者深受巴菲特觀點的影響,波特努瓦的適度抱怨是可貴的,有拋磚引玉的作用。

JOHN KIMELMAN

(本文譯自《巴倫周刊》)

(本文版權歸道瓊斯公司所有,未經許可不得翻譯或轉載。)

Sunday, May 18, 2014

Seth Klarman-20140308

Adapted from
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-03-08/seth-klarman-born-bulls-bitcoin-truman-show-market


With 40% of the portfolio in cash and having returned $4 billion to clients at year-end, Seth Klarman's Baupost Group has "drawn the line in the sand" as they reflect on the diminished opportunities in the so-called "Truman Show" market we see today. In the face of mixed economic data and at a critical inflection point in Federal Reserve policy, Klarman notes, the stock market, heading into 2014, resembles a Rorschach test - "what investors see in the inkblots says considerably more about them than it does about the market." From "born bulls" to "worry genes" and from Bitcoin to flash-mob-speculation, "there is a growing gap between the financial markets and the real economy...and the overall picture is one of growing risk and inadequate potential return almost everywhere one looks... as every 'Truman' under Bernanke’s dome knows the environment is phony."

Excerpted from Baupost Group's Seth Klarman letter,

"Born Bulls"

In the face of mixed economic data and at a critical inflection point in Federal Reserve policy, the stock market, heading into 2014, resembles a Rorschach test. What investors see in the inkblots says considerably more about them than it does about the market.

If you were born bullish, if you’ve never met a market you didn’t like, if you have a consistently short memory, then stock probably look attractive, even compelling. Price-earnings ratios, while elevated, are not in the stratosphere. Deficits are shrinking at the federal and state levels. The consumer balance sheet is on the mend. U.S. housing is recovering, and in some markets, prices have surpassed the prior peak. The nation is on the road to energy independence. With bonds yielding so little, equities appear to be the only game in town. The Fed will continue to hold interest rates extremely low, leaving investors no choice but to buy stocks it doesn’t matter that the S&P has almost tripled from its spring 2009 lows, or that the Fed has begun to taper purchases and interest rates have spiked. Indeed, the stock rally on December’s taper announcement is, for this contingent, confirmation of the strength of this bull market. The picture is unmistakably favorable. QE has worked. If the economy or markets should backslide, the Fed undoubtedly stands ready to once again ride to the rescue. The Bernanke/Yellen put is intact. For now, there are no bubbles, either in sight or over the horizon.

But if you have the worry gene, if you’re more focused on downside than upside, if you’re more interested in return of capital than return on capital, if you have any sense of market history, then there’s more than enough to be concerned about. A policy of near-zero short-term interest rates continues to distort reality with unknown but worrisome long-term consequences. Even as the Fed begins to taper, the announced plan is so mild and contingent – one pundit called it “taper-lite” – that we can draw no legitimate conclusions about the Fed’s ability to end QE without severe consequences. Fiscal stimulus, in the form of sizable deficits, has propped up the consumer, thereby inflating corporate revenues and earnings. But what is the right multiple to pay on juiced corporate earnings? Pretty clearly, lower than otherwise. Yet Robert Schiller’s cyclically adjusted P/E valuation is over 25, a level exceeded only three times before – prior to the 1929, 2000 and 2007 market crashes. Indeed, on almost any metric, the U.S. equity market is historically quite expensive.

A skeptic would have to be blind not to see bubbles inflating in junk bond issuance, credit quality, and yields, not to mention the nosebleed stock market valuations of fashionable companies like Netflix and Tesla. The overall picture is one of growing risk and inadequate potential return almost everywhere one looks.

There is a growing gap between the financial markets and the real economy.

"Flash-Mob Speculation"

When it comes to stock market speculation, it’s never hard to build a “coalition of willing.” A flash mob of day traders, momentum investors, and the usual hot money crowd drove one of the best years in decades for U.S., Japanese, and European equities. Even with the ranks of the unemployed and underemployed still bloated and the economy barely improved from a year ago, the S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average, and Russell 2000 regularly posted new record highs (45 for the S&P, 52 for the Dow, and 66 for the Russell) while gaining a remarkable 32.4%, 29.7%, and 38.8% including dividend reinvestment, respectively, in 2013. It was the best year for the S&P 500 since 1997... In the closing weeks of 2013, it was as if the strong gravitational pull of valuation had been temporarily suspended and stock prices had been launched by a booster rocket, allowing them to reach escape velocity. As with bull markets past, favored stocks started to become unmoored and unbounded.

"Speculative Froth" and Dot-Com 2.0

Whether you see today’s investment glass as half full or half empty depends on your age and personality type, as well as your “lifetime” of experiences in the markets and how you interpret them. Our assessment is that the Fed’s continuing stimulus and suppression of volatility has triggered a resurgence of speculative froth. Margin debt measured as a percentage of GDP recently neared an all-time high. IPO activity in 2013 was greater than it has been in years, with 230 offerings taking place, 59% more than last year and approaching 2007’s record of 288 transactions.

Twitter, for example, surged from $26 to almost $45 on day one, and closed the year around $64. It was priced, after all, at only twenty times its projected 2015 revenue. One analyst suggests the profitless company might achieve $50 million of “adjusted” cash earnings this year, giving it a P/E of over 500. Some hedge and mutual funds are again investing in late-stage, pre-IPO financing rounds for hot Internet companies at valuations that only seem reasonable if the companies go public, soon, and at astronomical prices.

Amazon.com, with a market cap of $180 billion, trades at about 15 times estimated 2013 earnings, Netflix at about 181 times. Tesla Motors’ P/E is about 279; LinkedIn’s is 145. Even though Netflix now carries some original programming, we’re pretty sure we’ve seen this movie before. Some 23-year-olds have sold their startup internet companies for hundreds of millions of dollars, while the profitless privately-held Snapchat has turned down a $3 billion buyout offer.

In Silicon Valley, it seems that business plans – a narrative of how one intends to make money – are once again far more valuable than many actual businesses engaged in real world commerce and whose revenues exceed expenses.

Ominous Signs

In an ominous sign, a recent survey of U.S. investment newsletters by Investors Intelligence found the lowest proportion of bears since the ill-fated year of 1987. A paucity of bears is one of the most reliable reverse indicators of market psychology. In the financial world, things are hunky dory; in the real world, not so much. Is the feel-good upward march of people’s 401(k)s, mutual fund balances, CNBC hype, and hedge fund bonuses eroding the objectivity of their assessments of the real world? We can say with some conviction that it almost always does.

Frankly, wouldn’t it be easier if the Fed would just announce the proper level for the S&P, and spare us all the policy announcements and market gyrations?

Europe Isn't Fixed

Europe isn’t fixed either, but you wouldn’t be able to tell that from investor sentiment. One sell-side analyst recently declared that ‘the recovery is here,’ a sharp reversal from his view in July 2012 that Greece had a 90% chance of leaving the Euro by the end of 2013. Greek government bond prices have nearly quintupled in price from the mid-2012 lows. Yet, despite six years of painful structural adjustments, Greece’s government debt-to-GDP ratio currently stands at 157%, up from 105% in 2008. Germany’s own government debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 81%, up from 65% in 2008. That doesn’t look fixed to us. The EU credit rating was recently reduced by S&P. European unemployment remains stubbornly above 12%. Not fixed.

Various other risks lurk on the periphery: bank deposits remain frozen in Cyprus, Catalonia seems to be forging ahead with an independence referendum in 2014, and social unrest continues to escalate in Ukraine and Turkey. And all this in a region that remains saddled with deep structural imbalances. As Angela Merkel recently noted, Europe has 7% of the world’s population, 25% of its output, and 50% of its social spending. Again, not fixed.

Bitcoin And Gold

Only in a bull market could an online “currency” dubbed bitcoin surge 100-fold in one year, as it did in 2013. The phenomenon spurred The Wall Street Journal to call it a “cryptocurrency” craze, with dozens of entrants. Bitcoin now has an estimated market “value” in excess of $6 billion, leaving alphacoin, fastcoin, gridcoin, peercoin, and Zeuscoin in its wake. Now most sell-side firms are rushing to provide research on this latest fad, while “bitcoin funds” are being formed. Recent recruitment e-mails to staff such a platform reassure that even though experience is preferred, it is not required.

While bitcoin is yet another bandwagon we are happy to let pass us by, the thinking behind cryptocurrencies may contain a kernel of rationality.

If paper currencies – dollars and yen – can be printed in essentially unlimited volumes, and just as with all currencies are only worth what recipients on any given day will exchange in goods or services, then what makes them any better than the “crypto” kind of money? The dollars and yen are, of course, legal tender issued by governments, but in an era in which governments are neither popular nor trusted, that is not necessarily a big plus.

Gold, at least, has been regarded as “money,” for thousands of years, and it is relatively stable and widely accepted store of value and medium of exchange. It’s a well-known monetary “brand.” It doesn’t exist only (or at all) in cyberspace, and it cannot be printed on the whim of authorities. Ironically and perplexingly, while gold, the hard money alternative to the printing press kind of money, dropped 28% in 2013, the untested and highly speculative bitcoin went completely through the roof.

"The Truman Show" Market

Welcome to “The Truman Show” market. In the 1998 film by that name, actor Jim Carrey is ignorant of the fact that his life is a hugely popular reality show. His every action, unbeknownst to him, is manipulated while being broadcast to millions of TV viewers worldwide. He seemingly lives in an idyllic seaside community where the manicured lawns are always green and the citizens are always happy. These people are, of course, actors. The world Truman inhabits turns out to be phony: a gigantic sound stage created for a manufactured “reality.” As Truman starts to unravel the truth, his anger erupts and chaos ensues.

Ben Bernanke and Mario Draghi, as in the movie, are the “creators” who have manufactured a similarly idyllic, if artificial, environment for today’s investors. They were the executive producers of “The Truman Show” of 2013. A global audience sat in rapt attention before this wildly popular production. Given the U.S. stock market’s continuing upsurge, Bernanke is almost certain to snag yet another People’s Choice Award for this psychological “thriller.” Even in “The Truman Show,” life was not as good as this for investors.

But there is one fly in the ointment: in Bernanke’s production, all the Trumans – the economists, fund managers, traders, market pundits – know at some level that the environment in which they operate is not what it seems on the surface. The Fed and the Treasury openly discuss the aim of their policies: to manipulate financial markets higher and to generate reported economic “growth” and a “wealth effect.” Inside the giant Plexiglas dome of modern capital markets, just about everyone is happy, the few doubters are mocked and jeered, bad news is increasingly ignored, and markets go asymptotic. The longer QE continues, the more bloated the Fed balance sheet and the greater the risk from any unwinding. The artificiality of today’s markets is pure Truman Show. According to the Wall Street Journal (12/20/13), the Federal Reserve purchased about 90% of all the eligible mortgage bonds issued in November.

Like a few glasses of wine with dinner, the usual short-term performance pressures on most investors to keep up with the market serve to dull their senses, which makes it a bit easier to forget that they are being manipulated. But what is fake cannot be made real. As Jim Grant recently noted on CNBC, the problem is that “the Fed can change how things look, it cannot change what things are.” According to John Phelan, a fellow at the Cobden Centre in the U.K., “the Federal Reserve has become an enabler of the financial havoc it was designed (a century ago) to prevent.”

Every Truman under Bernanke’s dome knows the environment is phony. But the zeitgeist so so damn pleasant, the days so resplendent, the mood so euphoric, the returns so irresistible, that no one wants it to end, and no one wants to exit the dome until they’re sure everyone else won’t stay on forever.

A marketplace of knowing Trumans seems even more unstable than the movie sound stage character slowly awakening to reality. Can the clued-in Trumans be counted on to maintain their complicity or will they go off-script? Will Fed actions reliably be met with the desired response? Will the program remain popular? Could “The Truman Show” be running out of material? After all, even Seinfeld ended.

Someday, the Fed’s show will be off the air and new programming will take its place. And people will debate just how good it really was. When the show ends, those self-deluded Trumans will be mad as hell and probably broke as well. Hopefully there will be no sequels.

Someday...

Someday, financial markets will again decline. Someday, rising stock and bond markets will no longer be government policy – maybe not today or tomorrow, but someday. Someday, QE will end and money won’t be free. Someday, corporate failure will be permitted. Someday, the economy will turn down again, and someday, somewhere, somehow, investors will lose money and once again come to favor capital preservation over speculation. Someday, interest rates will be higher, bond prices lower, and the prospective return from owning fixed-income instruments will again be roughly commensurate with the risk.

Someday, professional investors will come to work and fear will have come to the markets and that fear will spread like wildfire. The news flow will be bad, and the markets will be tumbling.

...

Six years ago, many investors were way out over their skis. Giant financial institutions were brought to their knees...

The survivors pledged to themselves that they would forever be more careful, less greedy, less short-term oriented.

But here we are again, mired in a euphoric environment in which some securities have risen in price beyond all reason, where leverage is returning to rainy markets and asset classes, and where caution seems radical and risk-taking the prudent course. Not surprisingly, lessons learned in 2008 were only learned temporarily. These are the inevitable cycles of greed and fear, of peaks and troughs.

Can we say when it will end? No. Can we say that it will end? Yes. And when it ends and the trend reverses, here is what we can say for sure. Few will be ready. Few will be prepared.